The Concept of Man In Kirkhart's Consociated Model: A Phenomenological Existential Approach

CAROLINA DE LOS SANTOS-GUINA*

The distinctive mark of phenomenology as methodology lies in its capacity to reveal essences. Applied to the Weberian and consociated models, phenomenology becomes a useful tool in scrutinizing organizational experiences (reality) against ideal types (thoughts about reality). The choice of man as the focus of analysis underscores the need to arrive at an understanding of the individual as he responds to and is affected by organizational stimuli and the environment at large. This is more so because the consociated model is essentially based on participative theory and has strong existentialist underpinnings — implying that man has full capacity to be aware of his existence, consequently to be responsible for it, and to attain self-fulfillment through close interpersonal relations, creativity and spontaneity. It is within this framework that the dehumanizing tendencies of bureaucratic forms are best understood and the search for more relevant organizational forms becomes more meaningful.

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to explore the phenomenological-existential insights of new public administration. Much of what is "new" in the new public administration lies in the bits of philosophical threads which have been magnificently woven into a different fabric of organization theory. My use of the word "magnificently" is, of course, a bias in favor of the philosophical approach. But if only for the novelty of using this perspective in understanding the more mundane aspects of organization theory, I would like to think that my bias for the phenomenological-existential approach might well be justified.

The use of phenomenology and existentialism as a method of inquiry will be applied to the concept of man in the consociated model as developed by Larry Kirkhart. Kirkhart, then Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, was among the group of illustrious scholars who contributed to the conference at Minnowbrook in Syracuse University. The meeting dealt with the topic "Theory and Practice of Public Administration." His article, "Toward a Theory of Public Administration" in Frank Marini's volume entitled *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective* (1971), suggests an alternative model to Weber's bureaucratic type (p. 134). This model, which Kirkhart aptly calls the consociated type, is basically characterized by matrix-type structure, client-centered services and a high degree of social interdependence. The philosophical underpinnings of Kirkhart's model are strong; in fact, Frank McGee who wrote a commentary on Kirkhart's article very interestingly labelled this "new reality" as "phenomenological administration." And yet, what is "phenomenological"

*Chief, Finance Division, Policy Coordination Staff, National Economic and Development Authority.

in Kirkhart's article seems to be inade-quately explained. Although he makes an attempt at the beginning of his ar-ticle to trace phenomenological and existential influences in philosophy, sociology, and pyschology, a similar attempt to trace these influences in public administration theory is sadly lacking in his explicitations of the consociated model. As Frank McGee noted, Kirkhart "makes a quantum leap from Shutz's integration of Hus-serl and Weber's typologies of social action. . . to the consociated type."

The phenomenological-existential approach was properly introduced by Kirkhart; but he missed its explicit application towards the understanding of the consociated ideal type. It is pre-cisely at this point where this paper takes off. Admittedly, it lacks the thoroughness, the profundity and the fervor with which other scholars have addressed the subject, and it makes no pretensions at all these. At best, the paper seeks to bring together the relevant literature on phenomenology, existentialism, bureaucracy, and partic-ipative theory towards the under-standing of one central concept — man in the consociated model. De-spite the limited time and resources devoted to its writing, this paper hopes to be able to encourage new rip-ples of thinking along these lines.

What is Phenomenology?

To define the word phenomenology is a difficult task. The difficulty is partly due to the tremendous trans-formation in explanation which the word has undergone since the time of its founder Edmund Husserl, a Ger-man. Part of the difficulty lies in the poetic style of the scholars who wrote about it. Poetry is not always easy to understand; one has to expe-rience the meaning of language be-fore one can truly appreciate its theme or its message. A total under-standing of phenomenology must, just like poetry, also blend with expe-rience and the individual's total being. As Kirkhart acknowledges:

> Despite the problem of precisely defining phenomenology, there is no doubt about its basic theme: Only through a rigorous analysis of the structure of consciousness is it possible to establish a basis free of presupposi-tions for philosophy. This attitude is known as critical (as contrasted to the more familiar "natural" attitude).[1]

The natural attitude, according to Husserl, is the idea that a particular object is the object as it manifests itself through the exact description and determination of the sciences. He was opposed to the dualism of Kant which asserts the objectivity of sense data, resting within a rational context and always susceptible to lawful ex-planation. This was the same domi-nant strain present in the "construc-tionism" of Hegel and the "natural-ism" or "psychologism" of the posi-tivists — which maintains that the final truth can be discovered through reductionism. It was against these basic philosophical thrusts that Hegel reacted.

Phenomenology thus began as an attempt by Husserl to rescue philoso-phy from the empiricist tendencies of Hegel and Kant. He sought to create a rigorously empirical scrutiny of expe-riences as they are intuitively appre-

[1]Larry Kirkhart, "Toward a Theory of Public Administration," in Frank Marini (ed.), *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), p. 134.

hended. In contrast to the position held by the positivists, Husserl argued two central points presented as follows by Kirkhart. First, only ideas can have certainty; facts are always contingent. Insuring this uncertainty can be accomplished only through an analysis of the structure of consciousness. Another central idea in the phenomenology of Husserl is the subject-object relationship: an assertion that the act of consciousness and its object are inseparable; . . . they are the subjective and objective aspects of the same thing (p. 135).

These two ideas in the phenomenology of Husserl are essential to the development of this paper. A more detailed discussion is therefore , in order.

The Structure of Consciousness. Phenomenology is basically concerned with the problem of reconciling reality and thought about reality. The problem is made complicated by the obvious fact that we cannot know reality independently of consciousness and we cannot know consciousness independently of reality. We meet consciousness only as a consciousness of something; and we meet reality only as a reality of which we are conscious.[2]

Husserl disagrees with the positivists in asserting that only *phenomena*[3] are

given, but he claims that in them is given the essence of that which is (noumena). Lauer, in his explanation of Husserlian phenomenology, describes this distinction very clearly:

> If one has described phenomena, one has described all that can be described, but in the very constant elements of that description is revealed the *essence* of what is described. Such a description can say nothing regarding the existence of what is described, but the phenomenological "intuition" in which the description terminates tells us *what* its object *necessarily* is. To know this is to have an "essential" and hence a "scientific" knowledge of being.[4]

Thus, phenomenology's distinctive mark is in its capacity to *reveal essences*, in contrast to the positivists' approach to come to terms with *existing* reality. A simple example may help to bring home the point more clearly:

> A tree is no less a thing than is a book. Each of these two things has an *essence* which is entirely independent of any concrete, contingent existence that it may have. The essence of a tree is its "tree-ness" — independent of its height, the breadth, and width of its trunk, the contour of its branches, the shape of its leaves. The question as to whether it is an acacia tree or a narra tree is entirely without significance. The tree has an essence (its "tree-ness") which distinguishes the experience of a tree from that of a book. The essence of the tree is contained in the *experience* of that tree.

It is at this point that the phenomenological structure of consciousness may be examined. It must be emphasized that the consciousness with which the phenomenological is here concerned is not consciousness as a psychic function, in the manner of

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[2]Quentin Lauer, "Phenomenology: The Search for New Perspectives," in Jong S. Jun and William B. Storm (eds.), *Tomorrow's Organization: Challenges and Strategies* (Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1973), p. 278.

[3]*Phenomenon*, as used by Kant in his *Critique for Pure Reason* means "appearance of reality in consciousness" as contrasted with *noumenon* which means the "being (or essence) of reality in itself."

[4]Lauer, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

an experimental psychologist. He is concerned here with consciousness as a *kind of being* which objects exercise — the only kind of being directly available to the investigator. This is best expressed by the German word *Bewusstsein*, which means the kind of being an object of knowledge has in being known. This means that the only key we have to an object or thing is its *being-known*.

Going back to our earlier example, we can say that our consciousness of the tree is in the *kind of being* which the tree exercises on the observer. The tree has an *essence* which can be "seen" immediately in the act of consciousness wherein it is contained. It is in this manner that phenomenology is considered a study of consciousness. It is an attempt to examine each act of consciousness as a "pure" act of consciousness, seeking to discover in each thing or object, its essence.

The Subject-Object Relationship. From his analysis of the structure of consciousness, Husserl moved into a discussion of the relationship between the object (the thing being perceived) and the subject (the perceiver). He came to the conclusion that if one investigates the structure of pure consciousness, he will eventually discover that the act of consciousness and its object are inseparable. A person who comes to know an act of consciousness adequately will eventually come to discover the essence of a particular object.

It is of the essence of an object to be related to a subject. What is significant, however, is the discovery by the subject of the "objective essences" of an object, that is, a discovery of *what the object really is* independently of any arbitrary meaning which the sub-ject wants to give it (contingent existence). The positivist will contend that subjects simply "produce" objects, that is, a subject gives meaning to an object in accordance with how he perceives it. The phenomenologist however will deny this statement. He will insist that by investigating pure consciousness, one can discover a relationship which is truly *objective* (objective essence). *The validity of this objective essence* is not derived from the conscious act where the relationship resides. The object being perceived has an *objective essence* no matter who the subject grasping the object may be. And it is only through an examination of each act of consciousness as a "pure" act of consciousness that one can arrive at a discovery of its objective essence.

The tree, for example, has an objective essence — its "tree-ness" — regardless of who perceives it. This objective essence is independent of any arbitrary meaning or language the subject wants to attach to it. Another person may perceive it as a flower and call it as such; another may perceive it as a mountain and call it as such. Yet, the tree has an objective essence which makes it independent of any other meaning or language which is given by the person who perceives it.

From Phenomenology to Existentialism

The writings of Heidegger, Marcel and Buber who used phenomenology as an empirical investigation to come to a better understanding of the patterns of existence start the transition from phenomenology to existentialism. Existentialism attempts to understand the subjectively experienced complex of meanings that constitute

a given person's world designs. It advances the principle that the human being is characterized by his capacity to be *aware* of the fact that he stands out. Man's capacity to become aware of his existence — which distinguishes him as a human being separate from the rest of nature — implies that he can respond to the facts of his own existence and exercise his own responsibility for it. The existential approach is dynamic in the sense that it takes the person always as emerging. In fact, existence, which comes from the Latin root *existere* means "to stand out," to emerge.

The Phenomenological-Existential Approach

The positive science paradigm heralded by the scientific revolution in Europe, with its emphasis on scientific research and the physical laws, had already posed a problem of credibility and dissatisfaction among administration scholars even during the early part of the twentieth century. The styles of criticism vary, but the underlying cause is clear: the positive science paradigm is being questioned essentially because of the narrowness and irrelevance of its findings. Some maintain that positivism is losing ground due to a major alteration in the cognitive process of reasoning developed by those who reacted against it.[5]

Phenomenology thus became a major rallying point for the methodological discontent of this sort probably because of its stress on the impor-

tance of intuition in the perception of reality. The curious attraction which phenomenology holds for public administrators, other than its criticism of the scientific establishment, may lie in its emphasis upon perceptions and the discovery of essence. Under phenomenology, concepts such as "hierarchy" and patterned behavior are not seen as objects; rather, they are created intuitively in order to arrive at relevant explorations into the nature of administration.

It is useful to distinguish between phenomenology as a philosophy of science and as a methodology. As a philosophy of science, it concerns itself basically with an analysis of the structure of consciousness and existence; as a methodology, its distinctive mark lies in its capacity to reveal essences. It is in this latter context that the concept of phenomenology is used in this paper. The phenomenological approach is applied to the use of the Weberian and the consociated models as ideal types since they represent abstractions from observable phenomena. Organizational experiences become the subject of scrutiny and throughout the analysis there is the underlying attempt to reconcile organizational "reality" with "thoughts about reality," i.e., the ideal-type organizations.

The choice of man as the focus of analysis undercores the need to arrive at an understanding of the individual as he responds to and is affected by organizational stimuli and the environment at large. The existentialist underpinnings of the consociated model and participative theory would seem to imply that man's capacity to be aware of his existence and consequently to be responsible for it, makes him the central variable in

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[5]Howard McCurdy, "Fiction, Phenomenology and Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January-February 1973), p. 53.

organization theory. Accompanying this underlying assumption is the existentialist's primary concern for the means towards self-fulfillment. Self-fulfillment, according to the existentialist, is achieved through close interpersonal relations in an atmosphere of openness, creativity, and spontaneity. It is within this framework that the dehumanizing tendencies of bureaucratic forms are best understood and the search for more relevant organizational forms becomes more meaningful. Thus, the seemingly esoteric realm of phenomenology and existentialism will be shown to have finally come to grips with the more down-to-earth concern of public administration.

Phenomenology has illumined public administration concepts via its influences in the social sciences, particularly philosophy, sociology, and psychology. The influence which phenomenology exercised on these disciplines was comprehensively developed and interpreted by Colin Wilson and Michael Polanyi in the field of Philosophy; George Curvitch, Max Scheler, Alfred Schutz, and Alfred Vierkandt in the field of sociology; and Carl Rogers and Sidney Jourard in the field of psychology. These have been effectively summarized by Kirkhart and I will no longer trace them here.

Models of Man in
Administration Theory

Before we come to an appreciation of phenomenology as an approach to understanding man as he operates within an organization and his environment, it may be helpful for us to draw a historical perspective of man as he has been perceived by writers on administrative theory and organization behavior. Throughout the history of the field of administration, theoreticians and practitioners have made their own assumptions of man — some critically, others uncritically. Yet a general feeling of dissatisfaction seems to pervade the present state of the art.

In the process of tracing the various stages in the evolution of the concept as it is now contained in modern organizational and behavioral theories as well as new public administration, it is useful to draw from the typology of Alberto Guerreiro Ramos who made an attempt to reassess the evolution of administrative theory. His article is predicated on the idea that man should be used as a point of reference, a central focus, in order to come up with some sense of direction in dealing with administrative problems and in making public administration both as discipline and practice more relevant.[6]

Ramos identifies three models of man in administrative theory: (1) the operational man; (2) the reactive man; and (3) the parenthetical man. The last of these models — the parenthetical man — is largely a derivation from Husserl's distinction between the natural and critical attitudes. As will be shown later, the influence of phenomenology can be dominantly perceived in this last model.

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[6]This portion of the paper draws heavily from the article of Alberto Guerreiro Ramos, "Models of Man and Administrative Theory" in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (May-June 1972), pp. 241-246. The models of man which he developed in his paper was found convenient in trying to group the ideas of leading social writers about man.

The Operational Man. Administrative theory describes man in terms of the social system in which he operates. Therefore, he is the *homo economicus* in classical economics, the *homo sociologicus* in sociology, and the *homo politicus* in political science.[7] According to Ramos, these types basically conform to the criteria inherent in the industrial social system and therefore they seek the maintenance of that system.[8]

What are the implications and assumptions inherent in this model of man in the light of organizational design? First of all, the operational man is seen as an organizational resource to be maximized in terms of measurable, physical output. This was the same theme expressed in the writings of the classical public administration theorists and the proponents of scientific management. As a result of this basic assumption about man, organizational design began to acquire an authoritarian method of resource allocation in which the worker is seen as a passive being who must be programmed by experts in order to function within organizations. Man was viewed as essentially motivated by material and economic rewards and completely detached from other individuals psychologically. Management and administrative theories are treated as value free or natural and are systematically indifferent to the ethical and value assumptions of the external environment. Most importantly, the personal freedom and satisfaction of the person is regarded as extraneous to the organization.

The Reactive Man. As a reaction to this mechanistic view of man, a more sophisticated body of theory was developed in what came to be known as the Human Relations movement. This school of thought considered the nature of human motivation as well as the role of values, sentiments, and attitudes in production. Correspondingly, the model of man developed by the proponents of this movement was called the "reactive man." They saw the worker as a *reactive being.* The adjustment of the individual to the work setting became the primary concern of management and they began to enforce behaviors supportive of their rationality. But although the human relations writers were more knowledgeable about workers' motivations, the ends sought were not really changed at all. Procedures were developed for the co-optation of informal groups; the use of "personnel counselling" and skills in handling particular human relations were still geared towards the goal of the organization.[9] One thus comes to the conclusion that individual adjustment rather than individual growth was the main objective. "The final outcome of the mass application of 'human relations' was the *total inclusion* of the worker within the organization; he was to be transformed into what W.H. Whyte, Jr. has called the *organization man.*"[10]

It may be useful to cite some of the issues and criticisms raised against the human relations school before describing the next model of man.

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[7]*Ibid.*, p.242.
[8]*Ibid.*

[9]*Ibid.*

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 243. See William H. Whyte Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).

Ramos himself admits that the previously neglected features of organizational settings are receiving considerable attention today. "For instance, greater emphasis is now placed on process rather than structure, tasks rather than routines, ad hoc strategies rather than principles and prescriptions, and on what has been called changing organizations," non-hierarchical organizations, and participative management. Furthermore, the environment is becoming even more the subject of central concern.[11] It is his contention, however, that all these improvements — although laudable, are at best peripheral. This is so because the individual simply reacts to his environment. He adapts to it rather than changes it.

The Parenthetical Man. How can the model of the parenthetical man serve as an answer to these issues?

Ramos, in his article, traces the phenomenological origins of the parenthetical model. The adjective "parenthetical" is derived from Husserl's notion of "suspension" or "bracketing" or putting in parenthesis.[12] He applied this concept in trying to explain his "phenomenological reduction," the primordial and essential purpose of which is to bring to light the contact between consciousness and the world (as phenomena). This reduction reveals not only the *cogito* (the self-outside of the natural world) but also the *ego-cogito-cogitatum*, or consciousness-of-the-world. As used in this sense, consciousness constitutes the meaning of the world.

The parenthetical man that Ramos speaks of is able to detach himself from the world, and because he is possessed with a highly-developed critical consciousness, he is able to examine and assess it as a spectator. This ability to detach himself from the social milieu maximizes his understanding (consciousness) of the world around him. Note that in this process of "detaching" or "bracketing," there is nothing here similar to the skepticism of Descartes who detaches himself from the world and plunges momentarily into non-being. The kind of "detachment" or "bracketing" which the phenomenology of Husserl speaks of allows the individual to reach a level of conceptual thinking and therefore freedom.

The parenthetical man provides a refreshing alternative to the issues and problems confronting the present state of administrative theory, because the parenthetical man cannot be explained by the psychology of conformity like the operational and reactive models. He does not uncritically accept standards of achievement, nor would he easily find an escape in apathy or indifference. The parenthetical man does not over-exert himself to succeed according to conventional terms and as such he does not become a slave to organizational patterns. He would strive to affect the environment and draw satisfaction from it, not only because he understands it, but because he has a strong sense of self and an urge to find meaning in life.

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[11] Ramos, *ibid.*

[12] Husserl was basically a mathematician and it is with a mathematician's mind that he tried to develop his philosophical inquiry. In trying to explain his "phenomenological reduction," he puts the *world as phenomenon* in parenthesis. The putting in parenthesis (mathematically expressed as "the coefficient of nullity") attributed to the world has the purpose of bringing about an intentional contact between consciousness and the world.

Understanding the
Consociated Model

Why the Consociated Model? One of the main problems to be considered in the over-all guidance of the social system is the design of new kinds of organizations or new work patterns. It seems that the present state of administrative theory can no longer legitimize the functional rationality of the organization as it has previously done. The basic problem in modernizing societies during earlier times was to overcome the scarcity of material goods and elementary services. During the period of the scientific management movement, for example, a great amount of toil in work settings was technically and socially necessary and even inevitable. The assumption that the scarcity of material goods in earlier times are still the basic scarcities of today brings about the crisis in Western organizations.[13]

This paper does not attempt to label the consociated type of organizational design as the organizational alternative for the problems of present-day societies. Evidently, the environmental context within which it was developed, i.e., the United States and other affluent societies, does not reflect the realities in other parts of the globe. At best, it is intended to portray one of the objective possibilities which would be reasonable responses to the problem of organizing for adaptability and change. Our choice of the consociated model derives from the fact that it has met the bureaucratic model (of the Webe-

rian type) on its own terms. This becomes a significant factor when we consider that many people still believe in the virtues of bureaucracy and are not likely to be convinced that it is possible to have a rational organization unless it more or less follows the parameters delineated by Weber. Kirkhart aptly states that a great many empirical studies and theoretical summaries explicitly rest on the Weberian concepts of formal organization.[14] The reliance on the bureaucratic type has failed to be transcended by other approaches like the cybernetics and systems approaches. There is always a return, it seems, to the structural variables involved in the bureaucratic type.

Another reason for focusing on the consociated type is the fact that it somehow stimulates the search for more relevant organizational responses to human needs within and outside organizations. It delves deep into the core of solving the human aspects of organizations — the impending disastrous effects which alienation brings. What is most interesting is the fact that phenomenology, either as a sociological insight or as a psychological approach, has been most influential in leading Kirkhart (and the other new

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[14]Kirkhart, *op.cit.*, p. 144. Kirkhart cites Warren Bennis' book, *Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evaluation of Human Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966) as an exception to this statement. In the comment of Frank McGee to Kirkhart's article, he affirms this statement of Kirkhart by reiterating that almost all organization-theory literature alludes to bureaucracy implicitly or explicitly. (See Frank McGee, "Comment: Phenomenological Administration — A New Reality," in Frank Marini, *op.cit.*, pp. 164-171).

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[13] See John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (The New American Library Inc., 1958) in Ramos, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

public administration theorists as well) into unexplored dimensions of organizational thought. If only for this methodological insight, the consociated model is worth more than a simple glossing over.

The Conceptual Framework for the Consociated Model. The sociologist Alfred Schutz coined the term "consociates" to refer to persons with whom one interacts directly in the "social world," the latter referring in turn to "all persons with whom it is possible to have a direct experience — in other words, all living human beings." Among consociates, the relationship can be in terms of the *Thou* relationship in which the other person is perceived as a subject rather than an object, the *We* relationship in which both individuals perceive each other as subjects, and the *They* relationship in which others are viewed anonymously.[15] The *We* relationship of the consociates is the most important of all these because it is here when persons experience true disclosure of motives. This disclosure occurs in the *We* relationship because adjustment to the behavior of others can occur with maximum facility.

In addition to appreciating Schutz's concept of consociates, Kirkhart's model traces its roots to the ideal type bureaucracy of Weber. Kirkhart states that public administration is traditionally associated with the problem of bureaucracy and that most of the empirical and theoretical studies have actually revolved around the Weberian theoretical base. In developing his theory of the consociated type, Kirkhart thus proceeds from a reexamina-

tion of the Weberian conceptual framework. He first assessed some features of the general framework that Weber developed, then proceeded to an exploration of the meaning of "ideal types" or "pure types," and finally explicitated on the structural features of the bureaucratic ideal type — making this a springboard for the development of his consociated model.

What were some of the features of the general framework that Weber developed? Kirkhart began his discussion of Weber with a sociological analysis of Weber's concept of social action. Based on this concept, a typology for encompassing four types of social action was developed: affective, traditional, rationally purposeful, and rational in terms of values. (See Table 1.)

The typology depicted above, however, is adequate only for individual behavior. Thus, in order to work with social structure, Kirkhart moved to a discussion of a slightly more abstract level of analysis — Weber's typology of *social relations* which included six types: usage, custom, rational usage, fashion, convention, and law. These types follow a pattern that is more or less derived from the typology of social action. (See Table 2.)

Kirkhart deemed this typology more useful in providing for a conceptualization of social relations in terms of: (1) value orientations which may be held in relation to order and (2) the manner in which participation is defined. Value orientations may be legitimate or non-legitimate depending upon whether the action is perceived by members as that which is most desirable for all (legit-

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[15]As quoted in Kirkhart, *ibid.*, p. 138.

Table 1. Types of Social Action

Affective	Traditional	Rationally Purposeful	Rational in Terms of Values
Emotional factors determine means and ends of action	Both ends and means are fixed by custom	Action addressed to a situation with a plurality of means and ends in which the actor is free to choose his means purely in terms of efficiency	Means are chosen for their efficiency but the ends are fixed in advance

Source: Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 388, as adapted by Larry Kirkhart in his article "Toward a Theory of Public Administration" in Frank Marini (ed.), *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective* (New York: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), p. 151.

Table 2. Types of Social Relations*

Usage	Custom	Rational Usage	Fashion	Convention	Law
Actual uniformity of social relations	Usage on long familiarity or habit	Uniformity determined by the rational actions of actors under similar conditions	Usage determined by the presence of novelty in the corresponding behavior	Usage springs from desires of social prestige, usage determined by normative pattern	Usage determined by the presence of designated enforcing authorities

Source: Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 390 as adapted by Larry Kirkhart, p. 156.

*According to Kirkhart, there is considerable confusion about the exact number of precise definitions developed by Weber in this area. Kirkhart adopted Martindale's definition because they seem more plausible.

imate order).[16] On the other hand, participation may be open or closed depending on the participation of persons within or outside a certain order.[17] If participation was not restricted, an open social relationship was considered to exist. If it was restricted, a closed social relationship was considered to exist. From this concept of a closed social relationship Weber defined an order whose activities were oriented to specific purposes such as a corporate organization (p. 153). This definition, in turn, was the basis for his definition of an imperatively coordinated group (p. 154) which contained all the characteristics of a corporate organization plus the legitimate exercise of power utilized to maintain the internal process of the system over time. "Finally, an imperatively coordinated group that maintains itself within a given territory through the legitimate monopoly of the exercise of physical force was called a state" (p. 155).

Following this, Kirkhart proceeded to discuss Weber's concept of the role of public administration in relation to the state: "to maintain the legitimacy of the state as the social system with a monopoly on the claim to the legitimate exercise of physical force. . . . Public administration as a type of social action is defined insofar as, by virtue of the motives of the acting individual (or individuals), it takes into consideration the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course to the maintenance of the

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[16] Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 390 in Kirkhart, *ibid.*, p. 152.

[17] Henderson and Parsons, *op.cit.*, p. 139 in Kirkhart, *ibid.*, p. 153.

political order's monopoly of the legitimate exercise of physical force" (pp. 155-156). It is at this point that Kirkhart poses the question: given this definition of public administration, what kinds of organization are appropriate? He then compared the bureaucratic and the consociated models. Before we go into an analysis of this comparison however, some comments on the conceptual framework that has just been presented are in order.

That framework was intended to provide the link that is necessary to understand the consociated model in the light of Weberian theory. From all indications, it appears that Kirkhart really intended to make a comparison of the two types, and although he qualified, in his concluding paragraph, that "the consociated model is not intended to be the organizational model for post-industrial society" (p. 164), the normative ring which is discernible in his article is a bit disquieting.

The Methodology for Constructing Ideal Types. At one part of his discussion of the Weberian conceptual framework which eventually became the basis of his consociated model, Kirkhart explains, quite lengthily, the methodology and uses of ideal-types. The construction of pure types, according to Kirkhart, "involves the selection of a set of variables from the matrix of possible factors which are involved in an event or could be utilized to assess a particular problem" (p. 148). This implies the necessity of an abstracting process from a plethora of relationships which are suspected or discovered in reality. The pattern or configuration that emerges from this process, however, must be objectively possible and must be able to stand the test of casual ade-

quacy. Because of the abstracting pro-
cess involved in the construction of
pure types, it does not require the
belief that reality is rational. Kirk-
hart thus continues to argue that the
pure type or ideal type is simply a
methodological device to be utilized
in the process of understanding a
given phenomenon. "The purpose
of an ideal type is to portray behavior
patterns in their pure form, *unaffect-
ed by situational* modification; in
other words, it is a tool for compara-
tive analysis " (p. 148). Hence, ideal
types must be constructed so that
they can be utilized as a framework
for comparing different empirical sit-
uations.

An apparent gap in Kirkhart's arti-
cle is the fact that he immediately
proceeds to an explanation of Weber's
concepts without explaining why his
bureaucratic model constitutes an
ideal type. He simply proceeds on the
assumption that the bureaucratic ideal
type can be used as a model because
it has empirical support in literature
and that "the bureaucratic ideal type
seemed to be such a rational and
efficient way to organize" (p. 150). In
the statement quoted above, Kirkhart
states that behavior patterns, in their
pure form, are unaffected by situa-
tional modifications. Later in his arti-
cle, however, he states that the conso-
ciated model can be justified in terms
of the "current social conditions
(which) differed from those Weber ob-
served" (p. 161).

Kirkhart's use of the bureaucratic
ideal type as a methodological tool
for comparative analysis must be em-
phasized. He did not intend to use it
as a goal or a norm although he recog-
nized the fact that the American posi-
tivist scholars treated it as such. The
reader of his article might, in a similar

vein, infer that his consociated model
was also meant to be an ideal type and
therefore to be used only as method-
ological tool. However, the "normative
ring" of his article seems to convey
that it was meant to be more than
just a methodological tool but rather
using McGee's term a "wish-thought."
As Frank McGee has suggested in his
commentary, the normative quality
must have to be de-emphasized.[18]

The qualifications which were
made in the preceding paragraphs are
deemed necessary for the subsequent
analysis made in this paper. It is not
the main concern of this paper to dis-
cuss the propriety of using Weber's
conceptual framework as a basis for
the consociated model. By itself, the
consociated model has some features
worth looking into. At best, Kirk-
hart's model can supply us with an
initial scheme by which the effective-
ness and responsiveness of organiza-
tions can be gauged in a time of tur-
bulence.

The Consociated Model. Following
Kirkhart's use of the Weberian ideal-
type as a methodological tool for
comparative analysis, we will now pro-
ceed to note some of the distinguish-
ing features of the consociated model
as compared to the bureaucratic form.
It must be kept in mind that Weber
postulated the monocratic form of bu-
reaucracy as the most rational form
of organization given his definition
of the role of public administration
in the state. The comparative table
below shows the characteristics of
the bureaucratic and consociated
types as well as the criteria of effec-
tiveness and the consequences that
each would have for society.

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[18]McGee, *op.cit.*, p. 168.

Table 3. Comparison Between Bureaucratic and Consociated Types

Bureaucratic Type	Consociated Type

I. Structural Characteristics

Bureaucratic Type	Consociated Type
1. Continuous organization of official functions bound by rules	1. Basic work unit is project team
	a. financial autonomy
2. Specified sphere of competence:	1) lump-sum budget
a. obligations to perform functions which are part of systematic division of labor	b. situationally provided technology
b. provision of necessary authority to carry out functions	1) tailor-made information and feedback system — computer based
c. necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is subject to definite conditions	c. interdependent with other project teams
d. discipline, a stereotyped response to a command, rests on habit and voluntary submission	2. Multivalent authority structure
	a. no permanent hierarchy
3. Organization of offices follows principle of hierarchy	b. situational leadership
a. each lower office is under control and supervision of higher office	c. diverse authority patterns among various project teams
b. right of appeal and statement of grievances from lower to higher — responsibility for handling subordinate grievances may be higher in hierarchy or remain at the same level	3. Total organization based on time imperative
	a. established to solve a particular problem within specific time limits
	1) sub-units on shorter time parameters
4. Technical rules or norms regulate the conduct of office. Specialized training is necessary.	4. Diverse sub-unit (projects) programs to deal with some basic problems
	a. assumption of equifinality of means to goals
5. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing.	5. Social relationships characterized by a high degree of independence and interdependence
6. Members of administrative staff are separated from ownership of means of production or administration.	a. direct, authentic interpersonal, and intergroup communications
7. Complete absence of appropriation of official position by incumbent	b. disintegration and redevelopment of project teams facilitates direct communications
8. Selection of office holders	

Table 3 (continued)

Bureaucratic Type	Consociated Type

a. based on free contractual relationship
 	
b. selection on basis of technical competence
 	
   1) tested by examination or guaranteed by diploma
 	
   2) persons appointed, not elected
 	
9. Conditions of office
 	
   a. sole or primary occupation of incumbent
 	
   b. occupation constitutes a career
 	
     1) system of promotion based on seniority or achievement or both
 	
       — promotion dependent on judgment of supervisor
 	
       — insures that subordinate is dependent on superior
 	
10. Remuneration based on fixed salaries in money, plus right to pension
 	
   a. only under certain circumstances can employer terminate appointment
 	
   b. official always free to resign
 	
   c. salary based on position in hierarchy
	c. most permanent project team responsible for team building and basic encounter training
	
	   1) used to build trust, non competitiveness and interpersonal competence
	
	   2) team-building training prior to initiating project
	
	   3) basic encounter training used following disintegration of project team units
	
	6. Clientele served is represented in the organization.
	
	   a. cross-section of clientele
	
	   b. authority *equal* to professional members
	
	   c. to obtain better information on service needs and, whenever possible, to provide organizational experience to youth prior to college
	
	     1) latter is to help generate interest in post-college work in organization
	
	7. Organization is a place of temporary employment, not a career.
	
	   a. career is associated with a professional reference group outside the organization
	
	8. Record keeping is computer based.
	
	   a. performance goals of each project team shared with all others
	
	   b. requests for progress data automatically shared with others
	
	9. Professional role requires
	
	   a. technical skills

Table 3 (continued)

Bureaucratic Type	Consociated Type
	b. skill in preventing the emergence of more than minimal social stratification
	1) promotes interdependence
	2) promotes ambiguity useful in problem-solving
	3) maintenance of ambiguity builds greater trust between team members

II. *Criteria of Effectiveness*

1. Any legal norm may be based on

   a. agreement
   b. imposition
   c. expediency
   d. rational values
   e. rational values and expediency and is accompanied with a claim of obedience on the part of members of corporate groups

2. Every body of laws is an intentionally established body of abstract rules. Administration is rational, pursuit of interests specified in order governing corporate groups, limited to

   a. limits in legal precepts

   b. using principles capable of generalized application — approved or at least not disapproved by order governing group

3. Person in authority occupies "office" — subject to impersonal order which governs "office" and to which his action is oriented.

4. Person obeys authority only in his capacity as a member of corporate group and what he obeys is only the "law."

1. Any legal norm may be based on

   a. agreement
   b. imposition
   c. expediency
   d. rational values
   e. rational values and expediency and is accompanied with a claim of obedience on the part of members of corporate groups

2. Every body of laws is an intentionally established body of abstract rules. Administration is rational, pursuit of interests specified in order governing corporate groups, limited to

   a. limits in legal precepts

   b. using principles capable of generalized application — approved or at least not disapproved by order governing group

3. Situational adaptability of organization

   a. as a total system

   b. in terms of subsystems

4. Noncompetitive, trusting social relationships

Table 3 (continued)

Bureaucratic Type	Consociated Type
5. Obedience to person in position of authority not because of the individual but because of obedience owed the impersonal order	5. Attracting capable personnel
	6. Client-centered services
	7. Eliminating need for organization's services

III. *Social Consequences*

1. The tendency to "leveling" in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence	1. Social diversity and independent personal styles is facilitated.
	2. Persons derive minimal alienation from organizational experience.
2. The tendency to plutocracy growing out of the interest in the greatest possible length of technical training	3. Tolerance for conflict and ambiguity is increased.
3. The dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality. . . without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm	4. Basis for joining formal organizations is public values it supports.
	5. Problem of structural rigidity is reduced through intentional elimination of organization.

Kirkhart adapted the features of the bureaucratic type from Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 329-334 and 340.

Note: The features of the bureaucratic and consociated types were presented in separate tables by Kirkhart, pp. 156-161. For purposes of better comparison, the features of the two types are combined in Table 3 above.

Kirkhart mentioned two important variables which have changed substantially since the time of Weber and which eventually led to the development of the consociated model. The first one is inter-organizational mobility. Kirkhart states that movement from one organization to another was heavily frowned upon during the time of Weber. However, at present, such is no longer the case. The second factor is geographical mobility. Several decades ago, people's careers were established in a single community alone. Now, organizations must have to deal with a much more differentiated pattern of subcultures and community styles.

These two variables were the significant factors that were mainly responsible for spelling out the outstanding differences between the bureaucratic and consociated types. These structural differences are manifested clearly in three distinct aspects: (1) career, (2) control, and (3) clientele relationships.

As can be gleaned from Table 3 above, the consociated model does not assume that the individual sees his career in terms of one organization; thus, movement from one organization to another is a prominent feature of organizational patterns of the consociated type.

As regards control, Weber's formulation emphasizes a chain of command through a series of subordinate-superior relationships. On the other hand, control under the consociated type is promoted through "ambiguity rather than specificity and trust rather than competition."[19]

The next aspect worth noting is the clientele-relationship aspect. In dealing with clientele problems, the consociated model incorporates selected, non-professional personnel who share decision-making power with the professionals. In addition, the team approach and basic encounter groups are utilized to reduce impersonal rigidities, thus making clientele relationships more subjective (cf. the *We* relationship) and more effective.[20]

The general features of the consociated model mentioned above are supposed to be the strategic responses to the environmental turbulence and complexity which characterize post-industrial society. Although there is always the danger of viewing it as prescription, consciously or unconsciously, Kirkhart's organizational approach to environmental problems has served to focus a great deal of attention to the need for creating wholesome environment in which professionals can work with other profession-

als and clients through communications. As McGee has stated, the phenomenological component of Kirkhart's approach lies in the fact that he has suggested the possibility that there are ways of knowing human problems other than the positivistic way.[21] He has also shown that there may be other and more relevant organizational responses to human needs within and outside organizations besides that of objectification and measurement and that our most basic concepts of organization are apparently culture-bound.[22] His use of the ideal type as a methodological instrument enabled him to build a consociated model based on the manifest characteristics of organizations as he has observed them.

The Concept of Man in the Consociated Model

Thus far, we have outlined the general features of the consociated type. However, the thrust of this model on the individual brings us to a far more significant level of analysis — that of examining the possible implications of the consociated model on the concept of man. It may be helpful, for one, to understand how the consociated type enhances the individual's capacity to experience self-fulfillment. After all, the consociated model is primarily an attempt to rescue man from the drudgery and the alienation of the bureaucratic life.

This portion of the paper focuses discussion on man in the consociated model — how he achieves self-realization and how certain features of the

[19] Kirkhart, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[21] McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[22] *Ibid.*

consociated type help to enhance this goal. Hopefully, this part of the discussion will try to zero in on the human aspect which Kirkhart omitted in his article, since he stopped at the explanation of the general features of the consociated type. It will likewise identify some of the concrete processes where self-fulfillment can best be achieved. In the process, I will inevitably provide a passing critique of the bureaucratic type.

Levels of Awareness and Self-Fulfillment. Before these tasks can be undertaken, it is important to provide the framework for understanding how the phenomenological-existential man ultimately experiences self-fulfillment. According to Marcel, man ultimately experiences self-fulfillment by passing through three distinct levels of awareness.[23] At the lowest level, he is exposed to the data of the senses. He is aware only of his existence in a concrete situation prior to any reflection on the significance of the fact.[24] The second level of awareness is the realm of objective knowledge which is called "first reflection." It is in this level that the subject-object dichotomy develops. Man objectifies. He categorizes people and places; he solves problems by using techniques. In the third level of awareness, a second reflection is necessary to recreate unity. At this point, the distinction between what is in man and what is before him

disappears; the experience of unity is achieved.[25]

The difference between the two levels — the first reflection and the second reflection — is the difference between *having* and *being*. To have is to place objects before one's self.[26] To *be* is not to conceive abstractly but to participate concretely in the unity of being through *intuition*. Intuition is "the spontaneous awareness that there is a *self* beyond all division of man into his manifest faculties."[27] It is a positive mental activity beyond the scale of logical thought whereby man achieves his ultimate lucidity: "the elucidation of certain data which are spiritual in their own right, such as fidelity, hope and love."[28]

Thus, the process whereby man discovers and fulfills his true self is essentially rooted in communion with other subjects. It is the intimate openness of one individual to another, of an *I* to a *Thou*. The *I and Thou* relationship transcends the opposition between self and the other person by placing them in genuine intimacy. The relationship is not between, it is *within* two subjects.

According to Marcel, man's essential human dignity rests in the genuineness and openness of his relationships with other persons. The man who remains in perfect possession of himself is the man of integrity and honor. A man in this condition will never allow his word to be doubted, for to do so would be to cast doubt upon himself.

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[23] Gabriel Marcel wrote extensively on the subject of existentialism especially on intersubjectivity. He also explicitated on the dehumanizing effects of bureaucracy as cited in the article of Herbert Wilcox, "Hierarchy, Human Nature, and the Participants Panacea," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January-February 1969), p. 54.

[24] Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having* (Westminster: Darce Press, 1949), p. 117.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The Dehumanizing Tendencies of Bureaucracy. How does the bureaucratic type stultify man's attainment of self-fulfillment? First of all, fraternity is not possible in the impersonal setting of the bureaucratic type. The hierarchy and division of labor characteristic of the bureaucratic model encourage a person to view himself as a mere agglomeration of functions. This setting has the capacity of reducing man to an object-oriented being who views life as nothing more than a "timetable" of tasks to be dealt with by designated techniques.

Hence, there seems to be very little chance for self-realization within the bureaucracy. This chance continues to be dampened by the features of routinization, anonymity, large size, depersonalization, the demand for membership loyalty, the concern with the criterion of rational efficiency, and the tendency to judge people in terms of their output. Within the bureaucratic climate, the employee is continuously in danger of confusing his real personality with his official activities, of identifying himself with his functions. To quote Marcel:

> It is all too clear that the state of universal continuous registration and enrolment, from birth to death. . . can only be brought into being in the bosom of an anonymous bureaucracy; now, such a bureaucracy cannot hope to inspire any other sentiment than a vague fear — the same feeling that takes possession of me personally every time I have to deal in a government office with some impersonal official who identifies himself with his job. [29]

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[29] Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being,* Vol. I (Henry Requery Co., 1960), p. 83 in Michael Smith, "Self-Fulfillment in a Bureaucratic Society: A Commentary on the Thought of Gabriel Marcel," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January-February 1969), p. 27.

Marcel's fear, it seems, is that the bureaucratic man may internalize his discipline so much so that inner spontaneity becomes impossible. This brings about an attitude of indifference, an alienation that takes the form of apathy. This apathy stems from the routinized, impersonal, uncreative nature of the work.

The demands of loyalty in a bureaucratic setting have actually become the basis of promotion or "bonuses." This type of loyalty however, is not transcendent. It is a subject-object rather than an inter-subjective relationship.

Michael P. Smith puts forward the argument that "bureaucracy can also destroy intersubjectivity for those who become fascinated by output and corrupted by the desire to exercise power over the determination of production goals." [30] This dehumanizing tendency within the bureaucracy is further nurtured by the large size of modern bureaucratic organizations. Large organizations do not provide the proper environment for concrete understanding and communication which is possible for people within small, intimate groups.

In his article, Smith quotes Marcel and suggests that the answer to this problem is "to keep bureaucratic modes of behavior within proper bounds; to reestablish a legitimate sphere for concrete activities; to keep discipline and obedience within a strictly defined 'zone of application,' to prevent the advance of a Burnham-like world oligarchy of technocrats; to be wary of the danger of 'bloodless rationality' and to return

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[30] Smith, *ibid.,* p. 28.

to one's neighbor."[31] Smith's article continues to cite Marcel's warning against the proliferation of four major bureaucratic modes of behavior: (1) functional rationality or "pantechnicism;" (2) routinization; (3) loss of self-identity resulting from a misplaced pride in craft; and (4) loss of self-identity in a world of bureaucratic forms.

The first mode of behavior, functional rationality, is the result of excessive reliance on the role of speculative and technical knowledge. This can result in a "secularization of reason" which induces man to accept as valid those techniques about which he, as an individual, has no creative knowledge.[32] This pantechnicism will eventually altogether erase the process of reflective thought, and, by reducing all situations to problems, leaves less and less room for mystery.

Routinization is the second mode of behavior against which Marcel warns us. This mode poses an obstacle to spontaneity, creativity, and openness to others. Routinization can reduce an individual to a mere timetable and hence, should be avoided.

The third mode of behavior is concerned about the loss of self-identity which can follow from an illogical or misplaced pride in "craft." Within bureaucracy, this can take the form of pride in the efficiency with which the organization accomplishes sizeable tasks. But this is borrowed rather than genuine pride because it emanates from outside oneself rather than from an inner sense of personal accomplishment.

Finally, the fourth mode of behavior is concerned about the effects of the form-filling approach lest it cloud true self-identity. We are warned against a world in which

> . . . every individual (is) seemingly more and more easily reducible to an index card that can be sent to a central office and whose entries will determine the further treatment of the individual. A sanitary file, a judicial file, a file on payment of taxes, to be completed tomorrow perhaps by an estimate of character derived from handwriting analysis or facial measurements — in what is called an "organized" society such papers will be sufficient to decide the final disposal of the individual, without any account being taken of his family ties, his deepest attachments, his spontaneous taste, his sense of vocation.[33]

To summarize, an over-all evaluation of bureaucratic life seems to work against the deeply personal *I and Thou* relationship. If the bureaucratic modes of behavior are spread into the world at large, then, all genuine human relationships are threatened. Persons become objects as impersonality increases and spontaneous and creative behavior is stifled. This is not meant to give the impression, however, that the features of a bureaucracy should be discarded altogether. There is little likelihood, it seems, that complex, post-industrial states can do without the rationally efficient features of large organizations. Scheduling, coordination, and the ordering of tasks are still necessary to prevent probable chaos. How then does one delimit the dehumanizing tendencies of bureaucratic type organizations?

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[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Gabriel Marcel, *Man Against Society* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 129 in Michael Smith, *ibid.*, p. 29.

Assumption About Man in Participative Theory. There were already a number of scholars who tried to pioneer in the development of new forms and ideas to protect individuals from the misuses of bureaucratic instruments by which they live. Dwight Waldo, Chris Argyris, and Michael Crozier, as well as Todd La Porte, Orion White, Jr., and Robert Biller of the new public administration school have focused their discussion on decentralization, organizational devolution, confrontational administration, participatory concepts — all as a reaction to the fears and apprehensions that adherence to the bureaucratic form brings. Unfortunately, the limitations of this paper preclude an adequate exposition and analysis of the theories of these writers. Suffice to say that the basic proposition imbedded in the prolixity of their theoretical statements is that the hierarchical form of organization, implemented by the so-called Principles of Organization is inimical to, and destructive of, human personality.[34] The nexus of their theory is aptly summarized by Harold Zalesnik:

> The ideology is toward equality and against hierarchy. The individual is, *a priori*, pitted against malevolent organizations as *though* organizations were designed expressly to trample upon persons, rather than to secure desired purposes.[35]

Little doubt can be raised that Kirkhart, in trying to evolve his conconsociated model, was one of the zealous apostles of the "hierarchy-hating" cult. He rightfully belongs to the group usually referred to as the participative theorists, although in contrast to other theorists who utilize the sociological-psychological framework, he relies more heavily on the phenomenological-existential approach. Their assumptions regarding the nature of man, however, run along the same basic lines as follows:

(1) They assume the dignity of man and the need to protect and cultivate his personality on an equal rather than a hierarchical basis. .

(2) Man's perfectibility can be attained by close interpersonal relationships in an atmosphere of openness, spontaneity and creativity.

(3) Since organizational gains are largely a result of gains of people in them, the benefits (or satisfactions) should be distributed to those who are responsible for them. The people within the organizations should likewise be consulted in the process of making policy and establishing controls.[36]

These assumptions are essentially consistent with the humanist view that man is by nature anti-autocratic, anti-hierarchical, and anti-totalitarian; that man is essentially good but he has been corrupted by evil institutions, repressed by power and generally kept in an unfulfilled state.[37]

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[34]Herbert Wilcox, *op. cit.*

[35] "International Relations in Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), p. 1144 as quoted in Wilcox, *ibid.*

[36] Assumptions drawn from separate articles of M. Smith, W. Scott and H. Wilcox in the alienation, decentralization, and participation issue of the *Public Administration Review,* Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January-February 1969).

[37] William G. Scott, "Organization Government: The Prospects for a Truly Participative System," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (January-February 1969), p. 45.

Forms and Structures in the Consociated Model

The Organizational Environment for Man. The consociated model was built around these assumptions regarding the nature of man. As such, its basic characteristics provide for the organizational environment where authentic and genuine relationships can thrive. As can be deduced from Table 3, its basic characteristics include (1) working units organized around problems-to-be-solved (project teams); (2) leadership or executive roles evolving from the problem rather than predetermined by structure and specialized to the task of coordination (the "link-pin" among project groups); and (3) a high degree of interaction among people in the organization and between the organization and its clients.

The project-team organizational framework implies that there is no permanent hierarchy; project teams are established to solve a particular problem within specific time limits. The above-mentioned feature of the consociated model thus emphasizes the reduction of the decision-making point to the lowest possible level. Individuals are made to work and solve problems in a small group where a fraternal atmosphere exists. Argyris' findings support this trend when he states that role enlargement arrangements, whereby management calls upon the individual to participate in small groups, can provide the opportunity for the use of more important abilities, thus ultimately inhibiting the dysfunctional consequences of indifference.[38] Similarly, by pro-

viding the individual with power over his immediate work environment, this encourages him to express his knowing and feeling abilities. He is more likely to be spontaneous, creative and reflective "where he can make decisions concerning goals, policies and practices."[39]

The role of the leader or the executive in the consociated type emanates from the problem at hand and is not pre-determined by structures. His task is specialized to coordination (a link-pin function) as this is made necessary by the existence of several project groups or teams whose activities must be made coherent with goals. The consociated model demands that the leader or the executive be "democratic" — he is seen as one who encourages the use of the subordinate's knowing and feeling abilities, diminishes the feeling of dependence on leadership, and increases the employees' control over the work environment. Several empirical studies cited by Argyris indicate that such leadership tends to create a greater sense of cohesiveness within the work group, increases job satisfaction, encourages more flexibility in behavior and results in "greater group productivity whether the leader is present or not."[40]

Attributing organizational dysfunctions to hierarchy, the consociated model makes interpersonal relationships and interdependence among groups as independent variables in its organization theory and in its prescriptions for organizational problems. These variables are intended to provide direct, authentic, interpersonal,

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[38] Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization: The Conflict Between System and the Individual* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 188-189.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*

and intergroup communications. As a result of this interaction, trust, non-competitiveness and openness are expected to be built. Direct interaction with the clientele served is also favored to obtain better information on service needs.

Techniques for Participation. The above discussion has shown how some of the basic features of the consociated model have been used to explain the need for changing the bureaucratic orientation. It is interesting to mention that the participative theorists have even devised some techniques for the enhancement of interpersonal relationships required for new forms of organizations like the consociated type. These techniques include the T-groups, and laboratory training, among others. Warren Bennis describes the objective of these types of training as follows:

(1) Self-insight, or some variation of learning related to increased self-knowledge;

(2) Understanding the conditions which inhibit or facilitate effective group functioning;

(3) Understanding interpersonal operations in groups; and

(4) Developing skills for diagnosing individual, group, and organizational behavior.[41]

The techniques will no longer be described here. It will just be sufficient to note that the techniques involve isolating a group of trainees under circumstances where interpersonal interaction of group members, under the trainer's administration, will lead to the development of group culture supportive of relationships of trust, genuineness and openness. According to Argyris, the T-group trainer will "help establish a culture that can lead to increased authentic relationship and interpersonal competence."[42] Despite the acknowledged limitations of these techniques (as will be discussed in detail later in this paper), participative theorists claim that models derived from these types of training will constitute the administrative organization of the future. They predict that through the technology of laboratory training, a pattern of mutual trust and genuine openness will permeate interpersonal relationships in future administrative organizations, thus eliminating or altering hierarchical dysfunctions.[43]

Counter-Arguments: A Critique of Participative Theory

Like any body of theory, the consociated model and participative theory did not escape the scrutiny of critics who are skeptical about the workability of its specific components. Due to certain limitations this paper was not able to find any material offering a direct critique of the consociated model except, of course, for the short commentary offered by Frank McGee at the end of Kirkhart's article. However, there are a relatively good number of articles which specify the limitations and

[41] Warren G. Bennis, "Goals and Meta-Goals of Laboratory Training," in Warren G. Bennis, Edgar H. Schein, David E. Berlew, and Fred I. Steele (eds.), *Interpersonal Dynamics: Essays and Readings on Human Interaction* (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 693-696.

[42] Chris Argyris, "T-Groups for Organizational Effectiveness," *Harvard Business Review,* Vol. XLII, No. 2 (March-April 1964), p. 62 in Wilcox, *op. cit.,* p. 59.

[43] Wilcox, *ibid.,* p. 60.

shortcomings of participative theory in general and, for purposes of completing our understanding of the model, it would be beneficial to highlight at least the main points. The body of arguments and criticisms can be roughly viewed from three approaches: the sociological-psychological, the ideological, and the technological. The latter two, while important for a comprehensive view of the participative theory debate, do not touch on the phenomenological-existential points focused on here and will thus not be discussed further. Herbert Wilcox, in his article "Hierarchy, Human Nature and the Participative Panacea" offers one of the most interesting diagnoses of the theory of personality as embodied in the works of Abraham Maslow, Warren Bennis and Herbert Shepard. He cites Bennis as acknowledging the dependence of participative theory on Maslow's hierarchy of needs. He continues, however, with this important observation:

> Most contemporary organization theory, when it does deal with personality, bases its view of man on Maslow's "hierarchy of needs" theory. I am baffled to discover that little has been done to test the validity of this theory. That there is a hierarchy of needs, that the hierarchy is scaled from physical-economic to social and self-actualization needs, that once a need is satisfied, it is no longer a motivator, that one climbs the hierarchy only when the previous level of needs is satisfied, are assumptions upon which a good deal of the new organization theory is based. It would not only be useful, but crucial, to devise more empirical validation of these ideas.[44]

Although Bennis questions the lack of proof in Maslow's theory, he acknowledges its importance to and influence on new organization theories like those of McGregor and Argyris. Wilcox is quick to point out, however, that Maslow's theory contains a basic contradiction. An underlying assumption in Maslow's theory is the belief that man has a morally perfect nature, genetically programmed for the realization of the highest ideal — "self-actualization." However, civilization and the multitudinous factors in man's culture and environment corrupt the perfect moral nature of man. Maslow uses the latter statement to explain why a great number of people are still engaged in debasing competition and conflict for earthly goods. Wilcox argues therefore that:

> If the "instinctoid needs" of man and their relative prepotency are morally good, but human behavior is not congruent with the hierarchy of needs, it follows that the restraints imposed by culture and society are destructive of the moral nature of man. The man who is psychologically healthy, acting upon the inborn hierarchy of needs, resists enculturation, the internalization of the norms and values of his society's culture. . . .[45]

Maslow admits that the techniques necessary to scientifically prove his theory of the hierarchy of needs are non-existent and concedes that those available tend to disprove it.[46] Despite the lack of proof however, Maslow insists that the hierarchy of needs of relative prepotency must be a fixed, inheritable trait in man, independent of culture. He was acidly critical of Argyris, Bennis and others of their company of thinkers because

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[44]Warren G. Bennis, *Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evaluation of Human Organization* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 196 in Wilcox, *ibid.,* p. 55. It is significant to note that Kirkhart's consociated model was largely influenced by Bennis' works.

[45]Wilcox, *ibid.,* p. 56.

[46]Maslow, *op.cit.,* p. 136 in Wilcox, *ibid.,* p. 56.

while they exhort man "to be true to his own nature, to trust himself, to be authentic, spontaneous, honestly expressive, to look for the sources of his actions in his own deep inner nature" but "they do not simultaneously affirm the proposition that the self they are being urged to actualize is an 'inner core,' free of environmental and cultural influences."[47] Simply stated, Maslow's proposition is that the self-actualization advocated by a writer must be the actualization of a genetic and biological self.

Shepard, elaborating on the theory of self-actualization, states that culture has as much a role as the genetically determined nature of man.[48] Man, according to him, has acquired two modes of adaptation to his environment, primary and secondary. In primary adaptation, the survival of the individual is the mode chosen by evolution to guarantee the perpetuation of the species.[49] In the secondary adaptation models, "the focus is on the adaptive process which ensures survival of the species in its environment, and the behavior of an individual is to be partially understood in its contribution to that end."[50] Shepard then finds that the two adaptive modes give rise to corresponding kinds of mentality: *primary and secondary*. The former expresses itself through using people instrumentally and exploitatively to satisfy its own needs. This thrives in a hierarchical

organization and results in coercion-compromise systems.[51]

Shepard says that Maslow's theory is a product of the primary mentality and that Maslow's formula for self-actualization amounts to the individual rearranging his internal environment. This, says Shepard, reduces the individual's drive for self-actualization by changing his external environment, i.e., by changing his relationship with others so that his motivation is their needs. According to him, Maslow's hierarchy of needs concept leads an individual to satisfy his own needs, which prevents him from acquiring a secondary mentality driving him to satisfy the needs of others.[52]

The points highlighted above have a familiar ring. Shepard's primary mentality recalls to mind the reactive model of man as discussed above. The reactive man adjusts to his work setting — he finds a way to rearrange his internal environment (i.e., to satisfy his needs) which in turn reduces his desire to change his external environment (i.e., the desire to satisfy the needs of others). As such, no real change occurs. The individual is co-opted to his environment so much like Maslow's model and the primary mentality that Shepard explains. It is at this point that the relevance of the parenthetical man comes to focus. The parenthetical man detaches himself from the environment and refuses to be influenced by it. The "inner core" which he actualizes is not contingent on environmental forces and cultural influences; that is why the parenthetical man is said to have a

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[47]Wilcox, *ibid.*, p. 56.

[48]Herbert A. Shepard, "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations," in March, *Handbook of Organizations, op. cit.*, p. 1117.

[49]Shepard, *ibid.*, pp. 1117-1118.

[50]*Ibid.*

[51]*Ibid.*, pp. 1118-1125.

[52]*Ibid.*, pp. 1118-1119.

mastery of himself. To go back again to the language of existential phenomenology, the parenthetical man actualizes himself, not through a superficial relationship with another being but in "communion" with him. It is significant to note, however, that the existential phenomenologists reject the body-mind dualism and in contrast, affirm the unitary character of man's behavior as an active, unified organism. It is difficult to state categorically whether even the participative theorists, not to mention their critics, were fully aware of this underlying assumption. Those who used the phenomenological-existential approach might have taken this assumption into account. One cannot help but wonder therefore, as to the complete usefulness of sociological-psychological approach to the criticism of the consociated model.

Summary Statements

The paper dealt with an attempt to explain the nature of phenomenology as it originated from the philosophical genius of Husserl and as it gradually developed into the existentialism of Heidegger, Marcel and Buber. Phenomenology and existentialism are vital approaches to the understanding of the new forms and concept reflected in the writings of the new public administration breed. It is also important to bear in mind that the phenomenological thread which eventually became interwoven into the Minnowbrook perspective came as a result of the receptivity of the other social sciences, particularly sociology and philosophy, to the methodology suggested by both phenomenology and existentialism. In fact, it is probably the enriching interpretations of the sociologists and the psychologists that

broadened the horizons of the new administration theorists into adopting novel ways of looking at the world and reality. The new visions that emerged have undoubtedly affected administrative theory. Keeping these in mind, I proceeded to take a backward look at man as perceived by administration theorists through the years, using the models developed by Alberto Ramos. The emergence of the last model — the parenthetical man, which is basically a product of phenomenological methodology — now looms as an alternative to the issues of irrelevance and lack of responsiveness hurled against present organization theory and practice.

The consociated model developed by Larry Kirkhart presents itself as an appropriate organizational design for the parenthetical man. This is so because the model focuses on the human aspects of organizations and presents alternative responses to the disastrous effects of alienation caused by the rigidities of bureaucracy. The paper discusses how the model enhances the individual's capacity to experience self-fulfillment in all important aspects of the organization — career, control, and client-relationships. In understanding how this is possible, phenomenology serves as a very influential methodological insight.

A major portion of the paper is thus devoted to a discussion of how man can achieve self-fulfillment in the consociated model. The explanation provided by phenomenological-existentialism is that man discovers and fulfills his true self only in communion with other subjects. It is the intimacy and openness of the individual to another (the *I and Thou* relationship)

which makes him in perfect possession of himself as a man of integrity and honor.

The chance for genuine intimacy and openness, however, is dampened to a large degree in a bureaucratic setting. Its features of routinization, anonymity, large size, depersonalization, rational efficiency and the tendency to judge people in terms of output — all these confuse man regarding his identity and his tasks. In fact, the bureaucratic man may internalize his discipline so much that inner spontaneity becomes impossible. Persons become objects as impersonality increases and spontaneous and creative behavior are stifled.

Despite all these, there is little likelihood that complex, post-industrial societies can do without the rationally efficient structures of large organizations. Fortunately, having recognized this, a number of scholars have put forward certain prescriptions to protect individuals from the misuses and effects of the bureaucratic form. These scholars, generally espousing participation, have even devised techniques (e.g., T-groups, laboratory training, etc.) to promote and enhance interpersonal interaction. Hopefully, through these techniques, a pattern of mutual trust and genuine openness will pervade the interpersonal relationship in the administrative organizations of the future.